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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






YASSIN HAYTHAME MOHAMAD, 




MICHAEL C. BARONE, Superintendent; EDWARD J. WOJCIK, Deputy for Facility 
Management; KURT GRANLUND, Deputy for Centralized Services; OVERMYER, 
Major of Security; CAPTAIN IRELAND 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-00316) 
District Judge:  Honorable Maureen P. Kelly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 9, 2012 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 







 Pro se appellant Yassin Haythame Mohamad appeals the District Court’s orders 
denying injunctive relief and granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  
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Because this appeal is legally meritless, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).   
I. 
 In December 2009 Mohamad, then an inmate at State Correctional Institution at 
Forest, filed a complaint against prison personnel alleging violations of his First, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  He alleged the use of painful, unnecessary, and 
excessive force against him in connection with his placement in a restraint chair, naked, 
for twenty-four hours in March 2009.  The force in question was applied, defendants 
showed, immediately after he left his cell without authorization, retrieved items from 
other cells, refused repeated orders to return to his cell and lie down so that he could be 
searched, and belligerently invited a confrontation with prison personnel.  Defendants 
moved for summary judgment.  Mohamad later sought injunctive relief through a 
“Motion for Defendants Including Their Attorney to Cease Retaliation and Have 
Plaintiff’s Legal and Personal Property Returned.”  This motion arose from a January 
2012 incident in which Mohamad threatened war upon prison staff and was consequently 
removed from his normal cell, which was found to contain various dangerous weapons 
and other contraband including bottles of feces.  The District Court granted defendants’ 
motion and denied Mohamad’s.  Mohamad now appeals.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of orders granting 
summary judgment is plenary.  State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 
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F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the denial of injunctive relief for abuse of 
discretion but we review underlying factual findings for clear error, and our review of 
legal conclusions is plenary.  Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012).  Because Mohamad is proceeding in forma 
pauperis, we must dismiss the appeal if it is entirely without legal merit.  28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B).  
 A party moving for summary judgment must show that there exists no real issue as 
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c).  On appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Brown v. 
Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2002), but the party opposing summary judgment 
“may not rest upon . . . mere allegations.”  Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 
(3d Cir. 2001).  We agree with the District Court that defendants showed that there was 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact with respect to any of Mohamad’s claims 
against them.    
III. 
 The standard to evaluate whether prison authorities’ use of force is cruel and 
unusual is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”  Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 
1, 6-7 (1992).  The factors a court must consider to determine this are (1) the need to 
apply force; (2) the relationship between the need and amount of force used; (3) the 
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degree of injury meted out; (4) the extent of the threat to the staff and inmate safety, as 
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials based on subjectively known facts; and 
(5) any efforts made to mitigate the severity of a forceful response.  Giles v. Kearney, 
571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009).  The District Court rigorously applied these factors and 
determined that defendants showed, through a variety of evidence including misconduct 
records and digital video recordings of his behavior, that Mohamad had a history of 
threatening and assaultive behavior, and that on the occasion in question he exited his 
cell; reached into other cells, which gave prison personnel reason to believe he may have 
retrieved contraband; behaved belligerently; and refused repeated orders to lie on the 
floor after refusing to return to his cell.  Mohamad offered no evidence suggesting 
defendants used any more force than was necessary in restraining him, or that they used 
force maliciously and sadistically.  Mohamad provided no basis for contesting the 
defendants’ contention that they asserted bodily control over, and subsequently searched 
and restrained, Mohamad to defuse an escalating situation in a good-faith effort to restore 
discipline.     
 During Mohamad’s time in the restraint chair, he was deprived of clothing apart 
from a sheet over his lap; he was not, however, deprived of food, shelter, medical care, or 
safety.  The Eighth Amendment is violated when prison officials fail to provide “humane 
conditions of confinement.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).  Prison 
officials must not show deliberate indifference to a known substantial risk of serious 
harm to an inmate.  Id. at 828-29.  Prison officials must ensure that inmates get enough 
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food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and they must take reasonable measures to 
assure inmates’ safety.  Id. at 832.  An alleged deprivation violates the Eighth 
Amendment when it denies “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”  Rhodes 
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).  Defendants showed that a registered nurse 
continually monitored Mohamad and found no harm beyond mild edema just before and 
after his release from the restraint chair, that Mohamad’s subsequent grievances never 
mentioned any risk to his health as a result of his restraint, and that during his restraint his 
cardiovascular functioning was normal and repeatedly monitored to ensure that blood 
flow was not restricted.  Mohamad claimed that a cardiovascular condition that 
developed two years later was the result of his restraint in the chair, but the medical 
records he provides neither suggest a link between his restraint and his condition nor 
mention his health condition prior to that diagnosis.  Mohamad offers only bare assertions 
to support his conditions-of-confinement claim in answer to defendants’ plentiful 
evidence that they were not deliberately indifferent to his safety or medical needs.   
 Mohamad makes summary allegations that his placement in the restraint chair was 
retaliatory and lacking in due process, in violation of his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.  He claims that his behavior was appropriate and within prison rules, 
and that his conduct did not justify restraint.  Defendants’ evidence, including digital 
video recordings, plainly shows the falsity of these claims.  Mohamad can be seen 
repeatedly disobeying orders to return to his cell and close the door.  He can also be seen 
retrieving an item from another cell and indicating that guards should “bring it”—in other 
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words, he was looking for a fight.  The District Court correctly noted that Mohamad’s 
allegations of due process violations related to excessive force, conditions of 
confinement, and his medical care during his restraint are properly addressed through the 
Eighth Amendment.  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994).   The District Court 
also correctly noted that to the extent Mohamad alleges he was restrained in retaliation 
for his having filed a prior lawsuit, he has failed to offer the necessary evidence that 
defendants’ actions arose from a retaliatory motive.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 
(3d Cir. 2001).  In sum, we agree with the District Court that the only reason prison 
authorities used force and restrained him was his own conduct.   
 For similar reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Mohamad injunctive relief.  We agree that Mohamad’s threats of war upon 
prison staff, coupled with the subsequent discovery in his cell of various weapons and 
other contraband including bottles of feces, render the disciplinary conditions now 
imposed upon him, including his placement in the restricted housing unit, more than 
reasonable.  He is not restricted from the law library, and he has access to legal 
documents.    
IV. 
 Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for want of legal merit.   
